dering-the Soviet Union and the United States-are much smaller, neither being much more than a third as large as India's or more than about a quarter as large as China's. The 1 x 109 persons in China plus the nearly 700 x 10r in India represent about 40% of the world total, well over half the aggregate population of less-developed countries and more than the combined numbers in Africa, Latin America, and Europe with the Soviet Union added for good measure. Although both countries are the heirs of cultures thousands of years old, both are in a sense young nations, having begun their current national life after World War II when India became independent of British rule and the Chinese Communist Party established the People's Republic. The growth in numbers in China and India since the rebirth of the two nations, the changing rates of birth and death, and the factors accounting for the changes are obviously a significant chapter in recent demographic history. The future growth and future changes in the composition of the population of China and India and the future trends in fertility and mortality will help determine the well-being of a substantial portion of the people in the world.
Data on population in China and India in the past 30 years are characterized by different kinds of limitation and uncertainty. In regard to India, a large volume of detailed information has been published in continuation of statistics collected, tabulated, and published during the colonial period. The published data are frequently inaccurate in content (ages are grossly misreported in the 12 censuses conducted in India since 1872) or less than complete (births and deaths are incompletely registered even in the sample registration scheme initiated by the Registrar General in the 1960s). In regard to China, where government control of many aspects of daily life entails maintenance in each locality of a current record of every individual and where traditional beliefs in astrology mean that individuals know their date of birth with precision, the prerequisites for obtaining accurate data are tantalizingly present. Little emphasis has been given to the compilation of aggregate population statistics, however, and very few data have been published in sources accessible to foreigners, if at all, until the past 2 or 3 years. The possibility of achieving complete and precise statistics apparently has not been realized.
In other words, published demographic data for India are extensive but intrinsically less than fully accurate, and published data for China are sparse and potentially precise but, in fact, of an accuracy that cannot be fully verified. Nevertheless, because of the special interest of demographers in these two populations and because refined methods of analysis can exploit internal consistency in both sets of data to construct estimates, it is possible to depict with some confidence the general growth in numbers and the trends in fertility and mortality since 1950. The time pattern of changing birth rates in the two countries differs in year-to-year variability as well as in the extent of decline since the 1950s. There is no compelling evidence of large year-to-year fluctuations in the Indian birth rate; the modest downward course was at no point sharply reversed or suddenly accelerated.
On the other hand, numbers from various Chinese authorities who have published annual birth data indicate major fluctuations in birth rates around [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] and a subsequent substantial downward trend. Fig. 1 shows annual birth rates over the 30-year period from 1950 to 1980, as pieced together without correction from different Chinese authorities, and as adjusted for evident under-reporting.
During the "Great Leap Forward"' and the subsequent economic and agricultural crisis (1959) (1960) (1961) , the recorded number of births was sharply reduced. As more nearly normal conditions were restored, the birth rate rose above the pre-crisis level and then declined to a rate less than half the rate in the 1950s or mid-1960s. Fig. 2 shows annual death rates in China from 1950 to 1980. They are derived from data published by Chinese authorities, with no adjustment for understatement of the number of deaths. Because there is convincing evidence of under-reporting of births (especially during [1959] [1960] [1961] , one must suppose that the number of deaths was also understated, especially the deaths of infants and young children. To be consistent with the adjusted birth rates, the death rates in the 1950s and 1960s in Fig. 2 must be increased by 3.0-3.5 per 103. Because there is no obvious basis for appropriate adjustments for individual years, the rates as determined from Chinese sources are reproduced unaltered.
The uncorrected values show a major reduction in mortality. Because under-registration presumably was more extensive in the earlier years and during the crisis of 1959-1961, the true decline was probably even greater than Fig. 2 indicates.
BASIS OF SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN
POPULATION TRENDS IN CHINA AND INDIA According to the estimates assembled here, these two very large populations have grown to a comparable extent (78% for China, 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 19 tality was falling, death rates were very high in comparison with the rates in countries that had become industrialized in the 19th or early 20th century.
The aggregate performance of the two economies since 1950 is hard to compare because the two countries are so different in political and economic organization and because of the difficulty of assembling reliable data. Nevertheless, one may judge that the two countries have remained at roughly comparable overall economic levels. In both, the populations are still >80% rural, and in both about 70% of the labor force is in agriculture. In both, manufacturing output has risen more rapidly than aggregate national production; in both, estimated per capita incomes are still very low. Then, during the operation of the Emergency Act of 1975, when normal government machinery was suspended, the reduction of fertility suddenly was given high priority, with the initiation of a set of much stronger measures than any previously used. With the end of the emergency, and the defeat in the 1977 elections of Indira Ghandi who had invoked it, there was a reaction against family planning and especially against the elements of compulsion that had been used. At present, priority is again being given to the goal of fertility reduction (8, 9) .
Causes of differences in mortality trends
Official statements in the People's Republic of China concerning the desirability and legitimacy of lowered fertility as a goal have varied, sometimes abruptly, between extremes of strong affirmation and uncompromising opposition. To some extent these changes in position have been related to major changes in the political and economic strategies of the governing Communist Party. Policy goals have also been influenced by the need to reconcile official positions with Marxist dogma, a strong strand of which is passionate opposition to Malthus' views on population.
In The projected numbers are from ref. 11 . Later recorded numbers for population data are from sources listed in Table 1 ; national income data are from ref. 6. by about 30% in 20 years if fertility were unchanged, and that the gain with reduced fertility (at the postulated pace) would be about 14% greater-4% greater because gross national product would rise more, and 10% greater because the number of equivalent adult consumers would increase less. Provision of adequate opportunity for productive employment of a large and growing labor force is an almost universal and often intractable problem in less-developed economies. The introduction of modern methods of production in agriculture and manufacturing has been more successful in increasing output than in expanding the number of jobs. The lack of opportunity for productive employment is sometimes manifest in large numbers unemployed, in the sense of actively seeking work, and, in poorer economies, more often is manifest in large numbers engaged in activities of very low productivity-for example, more porters, more barbers, more small shopkeepers, and more farm workers than are needed to provide the actual level of service or of agricultural output. The failure of fertility to decrease in the past 25 years means that the labor force will continue to grow rapidly in the next 20-40 years, making the problem of providing adequate employment opportunities more acute.
The potential members of the labor force 20 years in the future are mostly already born, and their number will be much larger than if fertility had been reduced in the past 25 years rather than remaining almost constant. Specifically, the projected population in India at ages 15-64 20 years from now is about 60% greater than the current population at those ages; if fertility had been reduced by 50% in the past 25 years, the population of labor force age would increase by only about 30%. It would be difficult enough to generate productive employment for 30% more potential workers 20 years from now; one of the greatest costs of the failure to reduce fertility is that the additional number will be about twice that large.
The provision of needed jobs is made more difficult by the current structure of employment in India, where 70% of the labor force is in agriculture. Because (ii) Rapid population growth impedes improvements in the population's scientific and cultural level by putting too great a numerical burden on the system of education; it also creates "labor force and employment difficulties."
(iii) Rapid population growth is not beneficial to the improvement in living standards. About 58% of the added "consumption fund" each year must be spent on increased population; only 42% can be used to raise expenditure levels. In spite of a near doubling of food output, the per capita increase in food has been only 17%.
THE FUTURE POPULATIONS OF CHINA AND INDIA
In the absence of catastrophic events such as nuclear war, the populations of India and China are destined to become even larger, and by a large margin. If the Chinese were to achieve a total fertility rate of as low as 1.7 children born per woman by 1990 and maintain fertility that low for 30 years, the population would increase to a maximum of 1.22 X 109 in 2020 about 75% greater than the 700 x 106 it was when the birth rate began its big decline in the mid-1960s. To limit the increase to this amount will require an extraordinary success of the birth planning program. For many years, 30% ofparents would need to have only one child, and 70% only two. Ifa significant fraction had three or more, the proportion of one-child couples would need to be higher still. The social cost would be substantial. Many children would grow up with no siblings; many in the next generation would have no aunts, uncles, or cousins; very many parents would have no sons, and there would be an age structure with a marked relative shortage of younger workers, males of military age, etc. These features are very foreign to Chinese customs and values; the stringent and allegedly coercive means needed to achieve such low fertility might have adverse political effects as did less draconian measures in India.
In India, the failure to have started a large decline in fertility as early as in China implies a prospective growth on the order of 75% or more of the current population-to a maximum of at least 1.2 x 109, because the current population is nearly the size the Chinese population was when the birth rate in China began its dramatic fall.
The death rate in India is higher than that in China, but the prospective decline in fertility in India is surely more gradual; the attainment of a replacement level (total fertility rate of about 2.2 or 2.3 children) is long in the future, to say nothing of attainment of lower rates.
The reason for the large continuing increases in population in each country even after fertility is reduced is that population growth has its own momentum. High birth rates in the recent past mean that there will be many more potential parents for another generation than there are now. Even if every couple merely replaces itself, the population continues to increase by 50% or more.
Thus, the world's two largest populations are destined to become much larger. I believe today, as I did when working with Hoover, that if sensible economic policies are followed it will be possible to provide a somewhat better life for these larger populations than is enjoyed in the two countries today. Reducing fertility soon to no higher than needed for long-run replacement would improve the prospects significantly and would especially improve the social and economic future as seen from the perspective of early in the next century. Yet, the mistakes ofthe past cannot be cancelled; the birth rate cannot be lowered retrospectively. A lower birth rate now is desirable, but the ideal rate is not zero. There are social and political costs of excessive emphasis on the immediate achievement ofvery small families; the rights and sensibilities of the current population, and the disequilibrating effects of drastic changes in age composition must enter the calculation ofdesirable population policies.
